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ABSTRACT 
A wide variety of insurance products are currently avai lable for agricultural producers to 
insure against yield or price risks in the markets fo r the raw commodities they produce. 
Va lue-added enterprises, such as ethanol production, have become increasingly popular 
among farmers over the last decade. However, insurance aga inst declines in the va lue-added 
portion of their crops is not yet available. This paper outlines the development of an 
insurance product aimed at com producer who are members of an ethanol production 
cooperative. The product mimics the gross margin level of a typical ethanol production 
facility, and ha the potential to provide producers with a new and usefu l ri sk management 
tool to insure against price risks in the markets fo r corn, distillers dried grains with solubles 
(DDGS), ethanol, and natural gas. Monte Carlo analys is is used to develop fa ir premiums at 
various coverage levels. A historical correlation structure is imposed on the simulated price 
data using a method proposed by lman and Conover which maintains the marginal 
distributions of the variables. Histori cal analysis is carried out to examine how the product 
would have performed had it been offered over the last decade. The product is shown to 
perfo rm as intended, paying indemnities in years of extreme price volatility. 
INTRODUCTION 
General Introduction 
Value-added enterprises, such as ethanol production, have recently gained interest as 
tools for fam1ers to create new markets fo r selling thei r products. The Renewable Fuels 
Association (RF A) website reports that, as of February 2004, there were over 80 ethanol 
production faci lities operating, expanding, or under construction in the Uni ted States (U.S.). 
This comprised a total production capacity of over 3.7 bi llion gallons annually, which was 
more than a 40 percent increase in capacity from 200 I. Almost 90 percent of these ethanol 
plants use corn as the mai n feedstock or as a component in a mixed feedstock (i. e. com-milo 
mixtures) in the production process, representing almost 98 percent of the annual ethanol 
production capacity in the U.S. Iowa's production capacity, as of February 2004, stood at 
roughly 867 million ga llons annually, or 23.5 percent of the U.S. annual production capacity 
(Renewable Fuels Association 2004). 
Roughly half of these production faci li ties are set up as farmer-owned cooperatives, 
or limited liabi lity corporations (Renewable Fuels Assoc iation, 2004). Some of these fam1er-
owned faci lities require farmers to provide an initia l investment to obta in partial ownership 
in the facility, and then they recei ve premium payments that are based on plant profitability 
in addi.ti on to what they receive fo r an y grain they market to the faci lity. The EXOL ethanol 
prod uction plant located in Albert Lea, MN is an example of one of these types of fanner-
owned ethanol plants (EXOL, 2004). The farmer-owned ethanol production fac ili ties 
account for 40 percent of the total annual production capacity of the U.S. (Renewable Fuels 
Association, 2004). In some cases, membership "shares" are sold on a per bushel basis 
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des ignating a delivery requ irement, with premium payments made based on the proportion of 
tota l bushels processed that the producer delivers (EXOL, 2004). 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture's Risk Management 
Agency (USDA RMA) webs ite, the vast majority of federa ll y subsidized crop and revenue 
insurance po licies so ld in the U.S. are single crop policies that insure against low yields or 
revenues fo r each crop grown on the farm . These policies provide price and yield risk 
insurance for the commodity based on its raw form being so ld as the fi nal product. However, 
there are currently no federa lly subsidized insurance products avai lable through the USDA 
RMA that provide coverage for va lue-added enterprises such as marketing grai.n used for 
ethanol production (Risk Management Agency, 2004). Therefore, farmers are not able to 
implement a complete ri sk management plan for the portion of their production that is linked 
to these value-added enterprises. 
The purpose of this research was to deve lop a risk management tool that provides 
com producers, w ho are involved in ethanol production, the abili ty to insure against poor 
fi nancial performance of the faci lity. By insuring aga inst ci rcumstances causing low profits 
in the ethanol plant, the product w il l provide value to its owner du ring periods of low 
premium payments. The product mimics the gross margin level of a typica l ethano l 
p roduction fac ility that implements the dry-mill production process using com as the 
feedstock. The gross margin, premium, and indemnity levels are calculated on a per bushel 
basis to enable producers to uti lize the product based on how many bushels of com they 
intend to market to the ethanol fac ility over the contract year. 
A Monte Carlo an alys is, which implements the use o f simulated data to examine 
possible rea li zations under uncertai nty, is used to calculate fai r prem iums for the product at 
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various coverage levels. Sensitivity analysis is also performed by calculating fa ir premium 
rates under the assumption of higher levels of price volati lity. Historical prices are used to 
examine how the product would have perfom1ed had it been offered over the previous 
decade. The product is shown to perform as intended, paying indemnities to the owner 
during periods of high price volati lity. 
Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesi s is organized as fo llows. Chapter 2 is a brief literature 
rev iew outlining previous research in related areas using similar methodology. Chapter 3 
outlines the methodology used fo r each component of this research. C hapter 4 reports the 
results. Finally, C hapter 5 summarizes the conc lusions, along w ith suggestions for future 
research in re lated areas. The appendix contains additiona l data and figures. References are 
given at the end of this thesis. 
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LITERATURE REVLEW 
Ethanol Industry History and Outlook 
The use of ethanol, or ethyl alcohol , as a transportation fuel source dates back to the 
early J 900s when Henry Ford invented the Model T. However, high tax rates and the low 
cost of petro leum-based gasoline prevented extens ive growth in the ethanol industry. 
A lcohol and gasoline were used as a fuel blend during periods of oil shortages during World 
War T (WWI) and World War II (WWIJ) , but fo llowing WWIJ oil prices hit an all-time low 
making ethanol too expensive to even consider as an alternative to petro leum based fuels 
(Buchheit, 2002 and E nergy Info rmation Administration, 2004). It was not until the OPEC 
oil embargo of the early 1970s that the potential of ethano l was once again investigated. In 
1977, the Food and Agricultural Act was passed, which provided loan guarantees fo r biomass 
pi lot plants and extended funding for USDA research on renewable fuels and foss il fuel 
alternatives (Energy Information Administration, 2004). 
In 1978, the Energy Tax Act was passed giving a fou r cent per gallon federal excise 
tax exemption for ethanol blended motor fuels and granted a ten percent energy investment 
tax credit for biomass-ethanol conversion equipment. Then in 1979 many major oil 
companies, led by Amoco Oi l Company, began to market commercial alcohol blended fuels. 
By 1980, ethanol production faciliti es in the U.S. were producing 175 million gallons of 
ethanol annually. Between 1980 and 1985, additional tax reforms and environmental 
legislation increased the excise tax redemption to six cents per gallon and created a new 
schedule of income tax credits for fuel blenders. The number of ethano l plants reached 163 
in 1985 with a production level of 610 mi llion gallons, but only half of the plants existing at 
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that ri me were operating due to bad engineering and poor business decisions (Energy 
Info rmation Administration, 2004). 
ln 1988 ethanol began to be u ed as a fuel oxygenate as the city of Denver, Colorado, 
mandated oxygenated fuels fo r winter use to contro l for carbon monoxide emissions. The 
Clean Air Act Am endments of 1990 mandated oxygenated fuel use in regions all over the 
country, as the ethanol industry began to shift towards the use of natura l gas rather than coal 
as we ll as other cost reduci ng technologies. Jn 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) imposed the Renewable Oxygen Standard (ROS) which required that 30 percent or 
fuel oxygenates be produced from renewable sources. The ROS was later ru led an 
unconstitutional constraint to commerce, but it was considered one of the biggest 
contributing fac tors to the boon of the com-ethanol industry (Energy Info rmation 
Administration, 2004). 
Annual ethanol production in the U.S. grew to 1.6 billion gallons in 1995. Volati le 
com markets in the fo llowing year cau ed ethanol production to fall to 1.1 bill ion gallons in 
1996, but production levels have climbed steadily since then to over 2.8 bill ion gallons in 
2003. The current ethanol federal excise tax exemption tands at 5.2 cents per ga llon for ten 
percent ethanol blends and will be cut to 5. 1 cents per ga llon in 2005. The tax exemption is 
scheduled to expire on December 31 i.', 2006 (Renewable Fuels Association, 2004). 
The amount of com utili zed fo r ethanol production has seen a steady increase from 70 
million bushels in J 980 to over one billion bushels, or ten percent of U.S. com production, in 
2003. Ethanol production is projected to use two bill ion bushels of com annually by the year 
20 12 to produce over five bill ion gallons of ethanol (Renewable Fuels Association, 2004). 
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It is estimated that a 40 million ga llon per year plant provides a $142 mill ion one-
time boos t to a loca l economy while also expanding the local economic base by $ 110.2 
million per year through $56 million of annual direct spending. Such a plant is also 
estimated to create 4 1 fu ll-time jobs at the plant and over 600 j obs throughout the local 
economy. Local corn prices can be expected to raise fi ve to ten cents per bushel, helping to 
increase fam1 incomes whi le also boosting state and loca l sales tax receipts by an average of 
$ 1.2 million each year. The typical plant is a lso estimated to provide an average ten-year 
return of 13.3 percent to the plant's investors (Kapell and Urbanchuck, 2002). 
The continued growth o f the etha110l industry in the U.S. hinges on multiple factors. 
Demand dri ven facto rs include the use of ethanol to replace other types of fuel additives such 
as Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) (Di Pardo, 2002). While MTBE helps to improve 
engine efficiency and reduce emissions, it has also been li nked to contamination of drinking 
water suppli es in regions all over tbe country. The direct health threats of MTBE are 
currentl y unknown but its use is cmTently being phased out in man y areas, inc luding the state 
of Ca li forni a, lead ing to increased demand in new and larger markets fo r ethanol as a fuel 
additive (Environm ental Protecti on Agency, 2004 and OiPardo, 2002). 
Government policy is another facto r that will affect future growth in the ethanol 
industry. A t cun-ent prices, ethano l is still domi nated by petroleum based energy sources. 
However, w ith subsidy programs sponsored by the federal government and env ironmenta l 
regulations on emiss ions standards, ethano l has been ab le to enter and compete in major 
energy markets (Renewable Fuels Association, 2004). With passage of tbe American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 in October 2004, the government has extended the federal support 
through 20 I 0. The new bil l effectively removes the excise tax exemption of 5. J cents per 
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ga llon on alcohol fuels, while creat ing a tax credi t of 51 cents per each gallon of alcohol fuel 
used by fuel uppliers to create petroleum-alcohol fuel blends (Harl and McEowen, 2004). 
Another area of concern for the ethanol industry is the futu re projections for corn 
suppl y. Wisner and Baumel (2004) report that the current growth rate of corn uti lization is 
larger than the growth rate of domestic production. They attribute much of the increased 
demand to ethanol production growth and possible excess demand from Chinese market . In 
fac t, record crops in 2003 and another record crop projected for 2004 were unable to meet 
market requirements in either year. lf corn production continues to fail to meet market 
requirements, there may be large price implications a the price of corn increase (Wisner 
and Baumel, 2004). 
Ethanol Production Process 
The dry mi ll process of producing ethanol, using com as a feedstock, is a mature 
technology that is not likely to see significant cost reductions or increases in production 
efficiency (DiPardo, 2002). According to the Iowa Value Added Resource Manual and 
di cu sion wi th the Iowa Independent Renewable Fuels Association (IRFA), the dry-mill 
ethanol production process converts corn in to ethanol according to the fo llowing input-output 
relationship: 
Inputs: 
Outputs: 
I bushel (bu.) of Corn 
0. 165 million British thermal units (mmBtu) ofNatural Gas 
2. 7 ga llons of Ethanol 
17 lbs. (0.0085 tons) of Disti llers Dried Grains and Solubles (DOGS) 
While the input-output ratio is fixed across operations, fixed and overhead cost structures 
wi ll mo t defin itely differ between plant . 
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Ethanol and DDGS Markets 
As of June 2002, there were no futu res contracts traded on any of the major futures 
exchanges in the U.S. for ethanol or DOGS (Chicago Board of Trade, 2004, New York 
Mercantile Exchange, 2004 and New York Board of Trade, 2004). Prices for both of these 
commodities are dete1111ined on regional cash markets. In May 2004, the New York Board of 
Trade (NYBOT) introduced both futures and options contracts for ethanol derived from sugar 
(New York Board of Trade, 2004). The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) is planning on 
introducing an ethanol futures contract for ethanol derived from com sometime in 2004 
(Chicago Board of Trade, 2004). 
Ethanol is used mainly as a fuel additive in unleaded gasoline to improve emissions 
and reduce the dependence on non-renewable fossi l fuels (Renewable Fuels Association, 
2004). For ethanol to succeed in this market, the cost, or competitive price, of ethanol must 
be close to the wholesale price of gasoline. Therefore, historic ethanol prices should exhibit 
fairly high correlation with historic unleaded gaso line prices (DiPardo, 2002). 
DDGS is a type of feed ration additive used mainly i.n the dairy and beef industries. 
DOGS has also seen recent use in feeds in both poultry and swine industries. Corn and 
soymeal are two main substitutes to DOGS as a ration in livestock feed (Renewable Fuels 
Association, 2004). 
VaJue-Added Cooperatives 
Value-added cooperatives, also known as new generation cooperatives, are organized 
in a different manner than the traditional agricultural cooperative. Farmers are required to 
make larger financ ial commitments with the possibility of higher returns, while also meeting 
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quality and delivery requirements for the specific commodity (National Cooperative 
Business Association, 2004). 
Value-added cooperatives major focus is in value-added processing, whereas the 
traditional agricultural cooperative focuses mainly on the marketing of the commodity held 
by the member-owners (Kotov, 1999). These new generat ion cooperatives typically have 
some form of democratic control through a one-member, one-vote policy. A board of 
directors is also typically elected by the membership. Excess earnings are typically 
distributed to the members as dividends based on proportional ownership in the cooperative 
(Cropp, 1996). 
An Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs survey found that the main reasons for starting a 
value-added cooperative are to capture more of the added value from crops and low 
commodity prices. Agriculture has shifted from relatively small and di versified family farms 
to fewer and larger specialized operations. Farmers operating individually have difficulty 
expanding their operations to the required scale to be able to become involved in value-added 
processing. By pooling resources, value-added cooperatives allow small farmers to benefit 
from the added value of process ing such as ethanol production (Waner, 1999). 
Legislation bas been created to assist new generation ethanol cooperatives through 
income tax credits. Currently, small cooperatives producing less than 30 million gallons of 
ethanol a year are eligib le for a 10 cent per gallon income tax credit for up to 15 million 
gallons. This legis lation prov ides fanners with the ability to form ethanol cooperatives and 
compete with the larger private faci.lities built by companies such as Archer Daniels Midland 
and Cargill, Inc. Current legis lation fac ing the U.S. Senate Finance Committee hopes to 
expand this tax credit to plants producing up to 60 million gallons of ethanol per year whi le 
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allowing the tax credit to be passed through to the members themselves. The purpose of 
these changes is to encourage the creation of farmer-owned cooperatives given the 
anticipated growth in ethanol production over the next decade (National Cooperative 
Business Association, 2004). 
Federally Subsidized Agricultural Insurance Products 
There are currently a wide variety of federal ly supported risk management tools 
avai lable to farmers through the USDA RMA. These insurance products insure both price 
and yield risk by guaranteeing both yield and revenue levels to producers (Risk Management 
Agency, 2004). Goodwin and Kastens ( 1993) conducted a survey of Kansas farmers and 
found that 67 percent stated that commodity prices were their main source ofrisk, followed 
by yie lds and then input prices. 
Yield based insurance policies include Actual Production History (APH) policies that 
provide yield and price guarantees based on the farmer's individual historic yield levels and 
current prices respectively. The Group Risk Plan (GRP) policy guarantees average yie lds at 
a county level based on National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) yield projections 
(Risk Management Agency, 2004). 
Revenue based plans include the Group Risk Income Plan (GRIP) policy, which 
guarantees an average farm revenue for a certain crop on a county level similar to GRP. The 
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) policy provides a revenue guarantee for the entire farm 
rather than an individual crop using the individual fa rmer's historic tax schedu les. Crop 
Revenue Coverage (CRC) provides revenue protection on a s ingle crop based on yield or 
price decline from initial projections. The Income Protection (IP) policy is simi lar to CRC, 
protecting gross income for a spec ific crop. Revenue Assurance (RA) is available to 
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guarantee a target revenue based on the farmer's expected revenue (Risk Management 
Agency, 2004). 
A ll crop policy availability and app licability differ by region and producer and are 
offered at various coverage leve ls. M ost po licies are also offered for a variety of crops and 
can also include optional catastrophic coverage policy endorsements for excessive crop 
losses. However, none of the products currently offered through the USDA RMA insure the 
value-added nature of a crop. Rather they insure price or yield risk only for the commodity 
in its raw form (Risk Management Agency, 2004). 
Insurance Contract Speci fica tion and Rate Determination 
Han , Babcock and Hayes (200 I) developed two new types of livestock revenue 
insurance products for cattle and hog producers us.ing Monte Carlo analysis, effective ly 
insuring producer price risk in livestock and feed price markets. They structured the product 
as an Asian Basket Option, where the payout at maturity equals the difference (if positive) 
between the va lue of an asset portfolio and a set strike value. They imposed a hi storical 
corre lation structure to Monte Carlo simulations of monthly price distributions for livestock 
and feed prices. They ca lculated premium rates under the assumptions of lognonna ll y 
di tributed prices as well as under the assu mpt ion that prices follow an inverse gamma 
distribution. They also conducted welfare analysis to compare the welfare ga ins of revenue 
in urance relative to the asset portfolios they repli cate that are attainable through appropriate 
futu res and options trading transacti ons. They va lued the product based on deviations from 
predicted price levels in the relevan t markets, taking the value of the option as the fai r 
insurance premium. Predicted prices were taken as the average over the first 5 trading days 
in March fo r the re levant contract, whereas the ac tual price used for con tract settlement is 
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taken as the average settlement price over the la t I 0 trading days in each contract's 
settlement month. The volatil iti es used to generate the s imulated price distributions were 
taken as the implied vo latilities ca lculated from at- the-money options in the re levant options 
markets. Add itional ly, their product was based entirely on futures market prices to minimize 
the problem of moral hazard . 
Distribution of Prices 
Pope and Just (2002) discuss the empirica l evidence both in favor of and questioning 
the assumption of lognorma lly d istributed prices. They discu s the hi storical widespread 
acceptance of the assumption of lognormality and the use of option pricing models to rate 
various types of revenue insurance products. However, they discuss the fact that empirical 
evidence rend to suggest that modeling prices a lognormal tends to assign lower 
probabil ities to the ta il s of the distribution than data suggests, a phenomenon often referred to 
as " leptok:urtoticity." Empirical stud ies done by Black ( 1975), and Fama (1965), have also 
shown that actua l price behavior may be inconsistent wi th lognormality. 
Sherrick et. al ( 1996) test tbe va lidi ty of the lognormality assumption with 
specification tests using soybean option price data . They find that for contracts c loser to 
maturity, the Burr I1I distribution provides a more accurate rep resentation of the distribution 
of observed prices compared to the lognormal distribution. The Burr III d istribution is 
represented by the fo llowing probability density function (pdf): 
ayP0 r-t (ra + P" )- aypa<r-ti 
f( P·a yr)---------
' ' ' - (r a+ P")r+I 
where Pis the random commodity price and a, y, and rare parameters which spec ify the 
moments and shape of the distribution. Buschena and Z iegler ( 1999) a lso con ider different 
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parametric specifications in modeling price volatility for com and soybean revenue insurance 
contracts. They conclude that deviations from lognormality commonly occur close to option 
expiration, but that the assumption of lognorrnality is a more accurate approximation to 
quantify price risk further from contract maturity. 
Ritchey (1990), and Melick and Thomas (J 997) examined the use of combinations or 
mixtures of pure distributions for option pricing. They find that using mixtures of normal 
and lognormal distributions provides more flex ibility in obtaining the level of variability in 
skewness and kurtosis observed in actual price data compared to assuming a simple 
lognormal distribution. These mixed distributions are typically weighted sums of standard 
distributions such as the normal and lognonnal di stributions. By altering the values of the 
weights in the sum, they were able to achieve extensive flexibility in defining the shape of 
the mixed di stribution. 
The lognormal distribution, like the normal distribution, can be characteri zed by its 
first two central moments, the mean and variance. A lognormally distributed random 
variable, P, can be denoted by the following pdf: 
where: 
I 
f(P; µ ,a) = ~e 
Pa-'\/ 2n 
a l 
Jl+-e = E[P] = e 2 
' ' 2 ? A.- = Var[P] = e-µ+a (ea - 1) 
(In( P)-11 )2 
2a2 
If a random variable Pis distributed lognormally then the natural log of P, ln(P), is 
distributed nom1ally denoted by the following pdf: 
l (r- p )2 
f( ln P) = e 2a2 
a.fi.; 
where: 
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µ=£[In P] = ln(B 2 )- ~ ln(B 2 + ,f ) 
2 
.A~ 
a 2 = Var[ ln P] = ln(I + - , ) e-
Given a desired mean, B, and volati lity, er, one can easi ly calculate the specific values oO. 
andµ needed to specify a normal distribution of random variables where the exponential of 
the e prices are distributed lognormally (Greene, 2003). 
There is an issue that the sum of lognormal random variables is not lognormally 
distributed. ln fact the sum, or average, of lognormal random variables has no closed-form 
probability density function. Two ana lytical approximations have been employed in recent 
literature, using either a lognom1al or inverse gamma distribution to represent the required 
distribution. Turnbull and Wakeman ( 199 1 ), and Levy ( 1992) have supported the use of a 
lognormal di stribution as a good approximation. l lowever, Levy ( 1997) showed that the 
lognormal approximation does not fare as well as vo latilities increase. A more detai led 
discussion of normally and lognormally di tributed random variables can be found in Greene 
(2003), Woolridge (2003), or Miller and Mi ller (1999). 
Black's Option Pricing Model and Implied Volatilities 
Black's option pricing model for European futures uses an asset's volatility and 
current price along with the given option's strike price to determine the no-arbitrage price of 
the option (Kolb, 2003). Black' s European ca ll option pricing formula1 is represented by the 
following fo rmu la: 
1 
The notation used here follows Kolb (2003). Kolb (2003) also provides a formula for European put options 
consistent with the Black model based on put-call parity. 
where: 
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NO = cumulative nom1al distribution function 
s 
ln(- 1 ) + (0.5a 2 )~I x 
d , = r:-: 
a...; ~t 
d 2 = d , -aJt:i 
F, = asset price at time t 
X = option stri ke price 
a = annualized vo latility of the asset 
r = risk-free rate used for discounting 
~t = time to maturity for the option 
The model can a lso be inverted to use the asset price, strike price, and option price to 
calculate what is know as the implied volatility of the asset (Kolb, 2003). This can be 
interpreted a the volatil ity that is implicit in , or implied by, the asset market given all 
avai I.ab le information at the current time. 
Kolb (2003) and Campbell. Lo and MacKinlay ( 1997) discuss the comparisons 
between implied volatil ity measures to those ca lcu lated with historical data. Some 
investment professionals argue that implied vo latili ty measures are better es timates of true 
volatilities since they are "forward looking" in that they embody all investor expectations of 
how the given asset wi ll perform given current market conditions. However, it is also argued 
that these implied measures of volatil ity are restricted directly to parametric specifications 
within a pricing model (i.e. Black's model) (Kolb, 2003). 
The main advantage of us ing historica l measu res of vo latil ity is that actua l data is 
used to compute the volatility. However using past infom1atio11 to project the future behavior 
of an asset violates the theory of the random-walk behavior of stock prices (Campbell , Lo, 
and MacKinlay, 1997). Also there is a prob lem in determining how much historical data to 
use. W hile us ing larger time series of data may provide a more reliable mea ure, the estimate 
is based on data that may not be relevant to the asset's performance over the time period of 
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interest (Kolb, 2003). For example, us ing a larger time series may underestimate the true 
volatility at a given time if estimated after a market crash or boom. Of course using a very 
current, but small data set docs solve the problem of incorporating the most relevant market 
data, but also lower the re liability of the estimate due to the small number of observations 
(Kolb, 2003). 
Use of the implied volatility measure computed from the Black model assumes that 
all of the assumptions and restrictions of the model itself hold. Tbe assumptions of the Black 
model are that l ) asset prices adjust to prevent arbitrage, 2) stock prices change in a 
continuous manner over time, and 3) asset returns follow a lognormal di stribution ( Kolb, 
2003). Kolb (2003) and Campbell , Lo, and MacKinlay ( 1997) provide a more detai led 
discuss ion of the theory and implica tions o f Black's option pric ing mode l for futures. 
Derivative Pricing with Monte Carlo Simulations 
The use of Monte Carlo analysis is popular because of its tractability in various 
setting compared to other pricing methods such as dynamic-hedging approaches or risk-
neutra l methods (Campbell , Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). These alternative pricing methods, 
as well as applications, are di scussed in more deta il in Campbe ll , Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). 
T he methodology of Monte Carlo ana lysis is to s imulate many sample paths of an asset value 
P(t). The asset value is ca lculated for each sample path, and the current asset value is taken 
to be the average of these simulated values (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). 
Imposing Price Correlations 
To use Monte Carlo simulations to price the product, the correlation between 
different commodity prices must be captured to develop a set o f realistic s imulations. S imply 
assuming independence and then simulating price draws under thi s assumption does not 
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capture the real-world interaction between prices in related markets. Pope and Just (2002) 
discuss three different methods fo r drawing correlated random variables that come fro m 
different marg inal di stributions. 
One approach, which was developed by Johnson and Tenenbein (1981), involves a 
transformation w here functions of uncorre lated random variables are combined, forming a 
linear combination which yie lds bivariate di stributions embodying the desired degree of 
corre lation. This approach is known as the "weighted-linear combination" approach, where 
the weights arc determined by the degree of correlati on between the variables and the 
di stribution used for the transformation . The procedu re is analogous to taking random draws 
from a known distribution and then constructing a linear combination of the draws to yield 
vari ables w ith a known corre lation strncture. These vari ables are then transformed into 
unifom1 random deviates us ing the cumulative distribution function from w hich the draws 
were taken, and then us ing the inverse di stribution function of the des ired marginal 
di stribution to transform the dev iates into random draws from the desired marginal (Johnson 
and Tenenbein, 198 1). Johnson and Tenenbein 's method is limited to the bivariate case. 
The second method is one which was developed by Fackler ( 199 1 ), as an extension to 
Johnson and Tenenbein 's method, for multivariate applications. One disadvantage to 
Fackler 's method is that the transformations do not necessarily preserve the correlation 
structure if measured us ing the s imple correlation, or the Pearson corre lation coefficient. 
Spearman 's correlation coefficient, or rank corre lation, is preserved through the 
transformations in Fackler's method (Pope and Just, 2002). 
The third family of methods used in the insurance literature involves the use of 
copulas. A copula is a function that relates margina l di stributions to a joint distribution 
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function (Pope and Just, 2002). Copulas can be identifi ed from sample data, as outlined by 
Frees and Va ldez ( 1998). Copulas representing true joint distri butions can only be 
approximated and thus face many limitations. They are parametric in nature leading to 
sensitivity of parametric misspeci fi cation, and also possible bias from approximation enors 
(Pope and Just, 2002). 
Another method for imposing a desired co1Te lation structure to data was first 
proposed by Iman and Conover ( 1982). The procedure is open ended, can be implemented 
using commercia l spreadsheet software, and can be imposed on an y combination of densities. 
The original data is manipulated in that the origina l price draws are resorted. Thus, the 
technique preserves the origina l marginal distributiona l structure of each data series whi le 
changing the relationships among the series. 
The Iman and Conover procedure has four attractive properties . First, the procedure 
works well w ith any d istribution function. Most of the previously discussed corre lation 
techn iques are directed at standard di stribution functions and cannot be used with other 
distribution fu nctions. Second, the mathematics behind the procedure is not extremely 
complex. C holesky factorization and inversion of matrices are the most exotic steps in the 
procedure. Third, the procedure can be used under any sampling scheme. Fourth , the 
margina l distributions of interes t are maintained throughout the procedure in that the 
moments o f the marginal distributions are not affected by the procedure (Iman and Conover, 
1982). 
The procedure is based on rank correlati.ons. The rank conelation ( 1~ ), also known as 
Spearman ' s rho, for a given set of paired data (x ;,y;) is calculated by ranking the x's and y's 
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am ong themselves, from high to low (or low to high), and then subs ti tuting into the followi ng 
fo rmula: 
t~ (x,y) = I 
11 (n - l) 2 
where d ; denotes the difference between the ranks ass igned to xi and Yi and n is the sample 
size (Miller and M il ler, 1999). Iman and Conover ( 1982) point out that raw correlation 
numbers can be misleading when the underl ying data is non-normal or contains outliers, 
which i why the rank correlations are used rather than the simple correlation measure. 
The theoretical bas is for the proced ure is that given a random matrix A whose 
co lumns are assumed to have a corre lation matrix 1 (the identity matrix) and a des ired 
correlation matrix B, there ex ists a transformation matri x C such that the columns of AC' 
(where C' is the transpose of C) have a positive definite correlation matrix B. Since B is 
positive definite and symmetric, there ex ists a lower triangu lar matrix (the tran sfo rmation 
matrix) C such that B =CC' (Iman and Conover, 1982). 
Let X be an NXK matrix where each column contains random draws from a specifi c 
marginal d istri bution, N is the sample s ize, and K is the number of variab les. Let R be a 
matri x, of the same dimens iona lity of X, containing what Iman and Conover refer to as 
"scores." Iman and Conover suggest using ranks, random normal deviates, or van der 
Waerden scores (<D-1( i /N+ l)) where <D-1 is the inverse of the standard normal d istri bution 
functi on, N is the number of draws, and i = 1, ... , N) as possible scores. Furthermore, the 
corre lation matrix for the columns of R is assumed to be equa l to I (the identity matrix), 
meaning the elements of R are uncorrelated (Iman and Conover, I 982). 
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Define T to be the desired rank correlation matrix for a transformation (resorting) of 
X . Given Tis positi ve definite and symmetric it may be written as T = PP' , where P ' is a 
lower triangular matrix. P, the transformation matrix, can be fou nd us ing Cholesky 
factorization. The transformed matrix of sco res, R * = RP' , has a rank correlation matrix M 
which is approximately equal to the target rank con-elation matrix T. By rearranging the 
columns of X into the same ranking as R *, the transformed X matrix has a rank corre lation 
matrix equal to M , which is very close to the target correlation m atrix T (Jman and Conover, 
1982). 
Some of the deviation of M from T is due to correlation among the columns of R, 
meaning the assumption of the correlation matrix for the co lumns of R to be equal to I does 
not ho ld. Iman and Conover propose a variance reduction procedure to minimize the 
deviation of M from T. A matrix Sis found , such that SDS' = T, where Dis the actua l 
correlation matrix associated with the columns of R. Cholesky factorization can then be used 
to find a lower triangular matrix Q, where D = QQ'. Therefore SQQ'S' = PP '. Obviously, 
one possible solution is that S = PQ-1, where Q-1 denotes the inverse matrix of Q. Then the 
transformed matrix R*8 = RS ' wi ll have a correlation matrix exactly equa l to T. Let the rank 
corre lation matrix ofR*8 be equal to M8 . Comparing M8 to Mand T, it is shown that M8 is 
a more accurate approximation to the target rank correlati on matrix T (Iman and Conover, 
1982). 
For their analysis, Iman and Conover used van der Waerden scores in the score 
matrix. Hart, Hayes, and Babcock (2003) apply the Jman and Conover method in rate 
determination for whole fam1 revenue assurance. They show s ignificant reductions in cost 
2 1 
can be achieved through whole farm revenue policies as compared to insuring each farm 
enterprise individually. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Contract Details 
The contract was structured on an annual basis running from April to March to align 
the signup period with the signup periods for many other crop i.nsurance products available to 
agricultural producers through RMA. At signup, producers w ill need to provide info1mation 
on the total number of bushels that will be marketed (or the ownership share in the fac ility 
expressed in bushe ls) to the ethanol faci lity during the contract year. 
This product insures price risks in two energy markets (ethano l and natural gas), one 
raw agricultural commodity market (corn), and a by-product feed m arket (DOGS). The 
maj ority of the value-added ethano l cooperatives have annual delivery requirements for each 
member based on their proportion of ownership in the facility (National Cooperati ve 
Business Association, 2004). However, onl y prod ucers who are eligible to insure com under 
a crop or revenue product w ill be eligible to purchase the product, therefore production ri sk is 
not considered in the development of this product. 
Predicted commodity price leve ls and the dry-mill fixed proportions techno logy 
determine the guaranteed level of gross margin according to the following formula: 
( 
I I 12 12 12 12 ] 
MarGuar= J2 2.7*2iET'HP,+0.0085*f;DDGP,- f; CORNf-0.165* 2i NGP, 
where: MarGuar = guaranteed level of average gross margin ($/bu.) 
ETH~ = projected ethanol price in month t ($/gallon) 
DDGP, = projected DOGS price in month t ($/ton) 
CORN?, = proj ected corn price in month t ($/bu.) 
NGP, = projected natural gas price in m onth t ($/mmBtu) 
(! ) 
This formulation assumes equal marketings to the faci lity over the contract year. However, 
the product could also be formulated for producers who deliver their corn to the facility on a 
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di fferent delivery schedule by appropriate ly "weighting" the monthly commodity prices in 
the fom1ulation. The results reported in this study were all based on margin guarantees and 
actual gross margins assuming equal marketings by the producer throughout the year. 
Predicting Prices and Price Proxies 
To be able to formulate the product per the preceding structure, predicted price levels 
are needed for ethanol, com , natural gas, and DDGS. Predicting corn and natural gas prices 
can be done d irectly using the futures markets for theses commodities. However, there were 
no fu tures markets for ethanol or DOGS pri ces at tbe time this research was conducted. 
Therefore, pricing p roxies were developed for these two commoditi es to be able to fo rmulate 
the product. The introduction of futu res markets for ethano l on tbe NYBOT and CBOT in 
2004 provides the future potential for more accurately pricing a product of this nature. The 
popularity and trading volume in these markets will determine how useful they could be to 
more accurately price an insurance product fo r corn growers who are involved with ethanol 
production. 
DDGS is a type of feed ration additi ve used mainly in the dairy and poultry 
industries. Corn and soymeal are two main substitutes to DDGS as a ration in li vestock feed 
which have existing futures markets. Using a monthly average DOGS price data series from 
Lawrenceburgh, IN (Economic Research Service, 1994-2003) and average futures settlement 
prices for corn and soymeal over the same time period, the s imple correlations between 
DDGS, corn, and soymeal were ca lculated. The correlation between DDGS and com prices 
was fo und to be 0.775, while the 
correlation between DDGS and soymeal prices was found to be 0.7. Since corn and DOGS 
exhibi ted a higher (marginall y) correlation, com was chosen to develop a price proxy for 
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DOGS. The data sets for DDGS and com prices are plotted in Figure 1. The DOGS price 
data were regressed against the corn futures data, using the method of ordjnary least squares 
(OLS),2 to estimate the following model: 
DDGP, = a + /3 * C01WP, + £ , 
where: 
$5. 50 
DDGP, = DDGS price in month t ($/ton) 
CORNP, =com price in month t ($/bu.) 
£, = zero-mean, homoskedastic error-term 
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Figure 1: DDGS Pr ice vs. Corn Price, monthly averages 
(0) 
Ethanol is used mainly as a fuel additi ve in unleaded gasoline to improve emissions 
and reduce the dependence on non-renewable fossil fuels. Therefore, there is a fairl y strong 
relationship between ethanol and unleaded gasoline prices. The simple correlation between 
unleaded gasoline and ethanol was found to be 0.64. This was calculated using an average 
monthly price series of ethanol rack prices from Omaha, Nebraska (Nebraska Energy Office, 
2004), and unleaded gasoline futures settlement prices averaged over the settlement month. 
The data sets for ethano l and unleaded gasoline prices are plotted in Figure 2. The ethanol 
2 OLS is the estimation method used for all regression analysis in this paper. 
25 
price seri es was regressed against the unleaded gaso line fu tures price series to estimate the 
fo llowing model: 
ETHP, = a+ /3 *UNLP, + e, 
where: 
$2 00 
$ 1.60 
3, $1.20 
~ 
ETHP, = ethanol price in month l ($/gallon) 
UNLP, = unleaded gaso line price in month I ($/ga llon) 
e, = zero-mean, homoskedastic error-term 
Ethanol Price vs. Unleaded Gasoline Price 
(1980-2002) 
-- Ethanol ($/gal) 
i $0.80 +n:~-11- ---1..- ---
$0.40 
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Figure 2: Ethanol Price vs. Unleaded Gasoline Price, monthly averages 
T he Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) was calculated for the pricing models to 
compare their predicti ve accuracy to that of the accuracy level in futures markets. The 
(E) 
RMSE measures for ethanol and DOGS refl ect the leve l of accuracy of pric ing models D and 
E. The RMSE was calculated in each commodity's typical measure of price per unit as wel.l 
as on a percentage basis for comparison across markets. The base price level used in 
calculating the percentage based RMSE was taken as the average over the predicted and 
actual price levels for each respective commodi ty. 
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Projected prices are based on futures settlement prices3 for corn from the CBOT, and 
unleaded gasoline and natura l gas futures prices from the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX). The proj ected prices for all commodities will be taken as the average of the 
relevant futures contract settlement price over the first 5 trading days in March of the 
contract year. For example, the projected price fo r com in December of the contract year 
wi 11 be taken as the average of the futures quotes for the December com contract over the 
first 5 trading days in March of the contract year. Non-contract month prices for com are 
determined by linear interpo lation between the previous and nearby contract months 
projected prices. The projected price levels for gasoline and corn are used with pric ing 
models D and E to calculate price predictions for ethanol and DDGS. 
llistorically, unleaded gasoline futures have not always been traded out a full year 
when analyzing March futu re quotes (Barchart.com, 2002). In years where futures quotes 
were not traded a full year out, the crude oil market was used to create synthetic unleaded 
gasoline predictions. Oil futures have hi storically been traded over a full year out, with the 
historical monthly correlation between unleaded gasoline and crude oi l futures prices 
averaging 0.98. The synthetic unleaded prices are calculated by taking the percentage 
change in the predicted crude oil price from one contract month to the next, and extrapolating 
that change onto the predicted price for gasoline. For examp le, in March of 1997 the 
unleaded gasoline futures market was trading out through the December 1997 contract. The 
predicted price for unleaded gasoline for the January 1998 contract was calculated by 
extrapolating the percentage change in price from the December 1997 to the January 1998 
crude oil contract predictions onto the predicted unleaded price for December 1997. 
3 All futures price data was obta ined from www.barchart.com 
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Time Series Issues 
A common problem in using regression analysis with time seri es data is the presence 
of serial correlation (i. e. Corr [&, ,&,.,." ] * 0, fo r h * 0 ). According to Woolridge (2003), 
under the assumptions of the linear re lationships for the price series and a zero-mean error 
I\ 
term, the OLS regression coeffi cient estimates are unbiased (i.e. E[,B] = ,B ). However with 
the presence of serial correlation, the usual standard errors and t-statistics are not valid. The 
presence of serial correlation is very common in regression analysis with time series data. 
Serial correlation of order h is defined as the coITelation of error terms separated by b time 
periods. lt is often assumed that lim Corr[&,, &1+1o ] ~ 0, so it is common to test for the 
h~CSJ 
presence of serial correlation of order one and generalize the level of serial correlation of 
higher orders. Woolridge (2003) out lines the fo llowing test for serial correlation of order 
one. The residuals from the seria lly correlated regression model (in this case model D or E) 
are regressed on their own one-period lagged values: 
I\ I\ 
& 1 = p&1- I + f.,l1 (2) 
I\ 
Then the standard t-statistic for the coefficient estimate p is used to test the null hypothesis 
Ho: p =O versus the a lternative hypothesis HA: p t:- 0 at a given significance level (usually 
fi ve percent). Both regress ion models, D and E, were tested for 151 order seria l correlation at 
five percent significance. 
One of the s implest and most common transformations used is first differencing. 
Each price series is transfom1ed by taki11g the difference between the current period ' s 
observation and the previous period ' s observation. While differencing effectively removes 
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most of the serial correlation, it also results in the loss of one degree of freedom since the 
first data point in the series cannot be differenced (Woolridge, 2003). 
After testing for serial correlation in models D and E, and finding significant 
evidence of 151 order serial correlation, all of the price series were difference and used to 
estimate the following regression models for DDGS and ethanol prices: 
MJDGP, = /3 * !1CORNP, + s, 
MTHP, = j3 * !1UNLP, + s , 
where: !1DDGP, = change in DOGS price in month I ($/ton) 
!1CORNP, = change in com price in month I ($/bu.) 
11.ETHP, =change in ethanol price in month t ($/gallon) 
(6D) 
(6E) 
!1UNLP, = change in unleaded gasoline futures price in month t ($/gallon) 
s, = zero-mean, homoskedastic error-term 
It should be noted that models 60 and 6E have different interpretations than models 
D and E. Models 6D and 6E predict the change in the value of the dependent variable given 
a change in the independent variable. Models D and E can be used to directly predict prices 
for DDGS and ethanol given prices for corn and gasoline, respective ly. 1n models 60 and 
6E, " base" price levels for the commodities are needed, with the change from the base level 
of the independent variable used to calculate a change from the base level of the dependent 
variab le. This predicted change estimated by the model would then be added to the base 
level of the dependent variab le to ca lcu late the predicted price. 
While the main objective of the differencing transformation is to correct for serial 
correlation, there is another advantage to thi s transformation . First differencing can also 
transform a highl y pers istent time-series data set into a weakly dependent data set. Weak 
dependence is also a requirement for OLS estimates of coefficient standard errors, and thus t-
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statistics used for inference, to be valid . Highl y persistent data sets can often be described as 
fo llowing a unit-root, or random walk process where tbe cu1Tent period's value is determined 
by the previous period 's value plus some mean-zero, independent random disturbance. 
Greene (2003) outlines the Dickey-Fu ller test for a unit-root process where the time-series 
values are regressed on their one-period lagged values and then testing the null hypothesis 
that the s lope coefficient estimate is signi ficantly less than 1. The Dickey-Fuller test (at 5 
percent significance) was performed on all four of the price seri es used in this analysis. The 
com and DDGS price series rejected the null hypothesis (ev idence of high persistence), while 
the ethanol and gaso line price series results accepted the null hypothesis (5 percent 
s ignificance). In either case, differenc ing corrects for high persistence, if it ex ists, and 
creates a weakly dependent data set that can be estimated with OLS providing valid estimates 
for the standard errors, and thus t-statistics, for the coefficient estimates. A more deta iled 
discussion of time-series analysis and serial correlation, highly persistent data, unit-root 
processes, and testing procedures can be found in Greene (2003) or Woolridge (2003). 
Monte Carlo Price Simulations 
To determine fair premium levels, Monte Carlo analysis was utilized by randomly 
generating thirty draws of 5000 commodity prices. Each draw represented a distribution of 
commodity pr ices for a contract month. There are 12 price draws each for natural gas and 
unleaded gaso line prices, s ince these commodities have traded futures contracts fo r each 
month in the year. There are six com price draws as traded com futures contracts are traded 
for only 5 months of the year4 . The s ixth price draw is generated for the one year out March 
~ 
Corn futures contracts are currently traded for March, May, July, September, and December. 
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contract, as it is need for interpolation purposes. All prices were assumed to follow a 
lognormal distribution. 
The means fo r each price distribution were taken as the predicted prices for the 2002 
contract year us ing the rel evant futures market contract quotes, assuming futures market 
effi ciency. Implied volatilities, adjusted for time to maturity, were taken from at-the-money 
options quotes from the relevant commodity markets during the first week in March of 2002, 
us ing the Black 's option pricing model for futures. The annualized implied volatilities used 
in thi s research are calculated using at-the-money call option premiums and strike prices and 
then adjusted fo r time to maturi ty accord ing to the fo llowing formula5: 
where cr equals the time adjusted volatility, crA equa ls the annualized volatility calculated 
from at-the-money call opti on contract prices, and fi t equals the time to maturity, in years, 
for the option contract. This method for adjusting annualized volatility measures is outlined 
in Kolb (2003). The implied vo latilities are calculated as the standard deviation of the price 
in percentage terms. Therefore, the time adjusted implied volatility for a given price is the 
standard deviation of the natu ra l log of the given price, ln (P). Table A- 1, inc luded in the 
appendix, contains a summary of the price distribution assumptions. 
In imp.lementing the Monte Carlo procedure, incorporating the correlation among the 
variables is extremely important because it eliminates unreali sti c price scenarios from the 
analysis. The desired correlation structure was calculated from historical futures prices wh ile 
5 The software program Derivagem was used to calculate the annualized implied volatilities, based on the Black 
option pricing model for futures. 
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the method proposed by Iman and Conover ( 1982) was used to impose the historical 
con-elation structure. 
Each set of independent price draws could have been generated in Microsoft Excel by 
drawing from a normal distribution with a specified mean and variance and then 
transforming the draws to obtain an approximation to the desired lognormal distribution of 
prices . Let P be the desired mean given by the futures contract quote and CY be the volatility 
implied from the at-the-money option contract for the price distribution of interest. Let X be 
a normally distributed random variable with mean, µ,and standard deviation, CY . 
- 2 2 - 2 l -2 
Define ;!.2 = P (eu -1), and let µ = ln(P )- - ln(P + .-1.2 ). Then by the properties of 
2 
normal and lognormal random variables the exponential of X, e"', is logno1111a lly distributed 
with mean P, and volatility CY (standard deviation in percentage tem1s). Unfortunately, 
Excel exhibits a systematic bias when this method is used. The level of the bias is directly 
proportional to both the mean and volati li ty for the di stribution. For this analysis another 
method was used to generate the lognonnally distributed prices to avoid any misspecification 
caused by systematic bias. First, 30 draws of 5000 random variab les were generated from a 
standard 1101J11al distribution using Exccl's random number generato r. Then, the normal 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) value was calculated for each draw. Then each cdf 
value was transformed using the inverse lognormal cdf to a lognormal random variable with 
the specified mean, P, and vo lati lity, CY. 
Imposing Correlation Structure 
Each price distributjon was generated independently from its assumed marginal 
distribution. Therefore, the desired correlation structure was not yet imposed. Historical 
32 
com futures prices from 19 0 through 2002, and gasoline and natural gas price data from 
1985 and l 990, respective ly, through 2002 were used to calcu late the historical rank 
correlations for the relevant prices. The difference between the pred icted and actual price 
levels for each commodity was calculated for each contract year, taking predicted and actual 
prices as defined in the contract details section. Rank correlation of these price deviates 
were then ca lculated pair-wise to maximize the amount of data availab le. The calculated 
historica l rank-corre lation mah·ix is included as Figure A- 1 in the appendix section. 
For the Iman and Conover method to be employed, the target matrix must be positive-
definite, a restriction that the calculated matrix did not meet. The historical rank co rrelation 
matrix was modified to create a pos itive-definite matrix that fo llowed the same historica l 
correlation structure. The modifications performed differ between commoditi es. The inter-
temporal corre lations for the com price deviates were left unchanged . The inter-commodity 
and inter-temporal correlations between the com, unleaded gasoline, and natura l gas price 
deviates were . et at their respecti ve average va lues. The inter-temporal correlations for the 
unJeaded gaso line and natural gas price deviates were transformed using the followi ng linear 
regression mode l: 
RankCorr. = a+ fl* Lag 
1
. + £ '·1 '· '·J 
where: Ra11kCorr,., = Inter-temporal rank correlation between months i and} 
lag1•1 = time lag, in months, between months i and} 
(3) 
£ 1•1 = zero-mean , homoskedastic error term for lag between months i and } 
For example, the January and March natural gas contracts have a time lag of 2 
months. The dependent vari able in the c. ti mated model would be the va lue o f the calculated 
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correlation between January and March natura l gas price deviations, while the independent 
variable for that data point would equal the time lag of 2 months. 
The score matrix (R) was constructed from 30 columns of 5000 van der Waerden 
scores. The van der Waerden scores were rando mly mixed within each column. The Iman 
and Conover method was applied to the random draws of 5000 prices using a C++ computer 
program written by Chad Hart, Iowa State University. However, if the analysis bad used 
fewer draws, the technique could have been conducted within a standard spreadsheet 
program such as Excel. Given the target histori cal rank correlation matrix (T) and the 
random score matrix (R), the Iman and Conover technique solves for the transformation 
matrix (S) where the product (RS') bas a c01Telation matrix equal to T and a rank correlation 
matrix close to T . The transformed matrix of Monte Carlo s imulations (RS ') was then 
ranked by column from 1 to 5000 after the Iman and Conover technique was applied. 
The actual rank correlation matrix of the transformed Monte Carl o data is included in 
the appendix as Figure A-3. Also included in the appendix, as Figure A-4, is a matrix of the 
differences between tbe target matrix and the correlation matrix of the random draws. Tbe 
largest difference between the target and actual rank correlation values (in absolute value) is 
0.026. Therefore the Iman and Conover method provides a good approx imation of the target 
historical relationships. 
Premium Determination 
Each Monte Carlo s imulation can be interpreted as a possible price scenario for the 
contract year. The actual gross margin for an ethanol plant is calculated given the price 
scenario for each of the 5000 simulations according to equation 1. The difference between 
the simulated actual gross margins and the margin guarantee for the contract year (2002) is 
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then ca lculated. The option value to the owner is then equal to this difference, if positive, 
and zero otherwise. The option value is calculated for each of the 5000 simulations and then 
averaged to determine the fair premium rate for the insurance product. The per bushel 
premium rates are ca lcu lated in dollar terms, and then translated into percentage terms of the 
margin guarantee for use in other contract years. 
Contract Settlement 
At contract termination, contract owners receive an indemnity payment for each 
bushel insured based on the following formu la: 
where: 
Indemnity = max[O, MarGuar - MarA ct ] 
MarGuar = the gross margin guarantee for the contract year 
MarAct =the actual gross margin for the contract year 
The margin guarantee is ca lcu lated using predicted commodity price levels using 
equation 1, whereas the actual gross margin level is calculated using the actual price levels 
and equation 1. In determining the fair premium rates, actual price levels were taken as the 
simulated values. In practice, to settle the contract, acn1al price levels are taken as the 
average settlement price over the last I 0 trading days of the settlement month for corn, and 
the average over the en tire settlement month for unleaded gasoline and natural gas. Again, 
the pricing models outlined previously (models D, E, 60, and 6E) are used to calculate 
actual and predicted price levels for ethano l and DDGS us ing the futures prices for gasoline 
and corn respectively. Producers wil l be required to provide receipts of actual corn 
marketings to their facility at contract termination so that premiums and indemnity payments 
can be adjusted if actual marketings di ff er from expected marketings at the ti me of contract 
purchase. Since the value of this product is determined solely by futures contract prices, the 
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moral hazard problem is minimized. Individua l producers do not have the ability to affect 
futures price levels, and therefore cannot affect the likelihood of receiv ing payments. 
Add itiona lly, basing the product formulation on the assumption of a fi xed proportions 
technology eliminated the problem of adver e se lection. Riskier producers have no more 
incentive to purchase the product than less risky producers, where p roducer " riskiness" is 
defined in terms o f effi ciency of the respecti ve ethanol cooperative in which they hold 
membership. 
36 
RESULTS 
Pricing Model Estimates 
Both the slope and intercept estimates for model D were found to be significant at a 
one percent s ignificance level. Both the constant and slope coeffic ient estimates for Model E 
were also found to be stati stica lly s ignificant at a one percent significance level. The 
coeffic ient estimates, standard errors, t-statistics, p-values, and R2 values for both pricing 
models are reported in Table l. While the R2 values seem to be rather low, the accuracy of 
the models is compared to the accuracy displayed in futures markets in the following 
subsection. 
Table 1: Summarl' Statistics for Models D and E 
/\ /\ 
Model Dependent Independent a t-stat /J t-stat Va riable Variable (S.E.) (p-value) (S.E.) (p-value) 
0 DDGP, 
CORNP, 19.52 2.77 33.996 12.61 
($/ton) ($/bu) (7.04) (0.007) (2.700) (0.00) 
0.6 
E ETHP, UNLP, 0.72 17.15 0 .82 12.37 
($/gal) ($/gal) (0.04) (0.000) (0.067) (0 .00) 
0.42 
The coefficient estimates show that for every ten cent per bushel increase in the price 
of com, the price for DDGS can be expected to increase by about 34 dollars per ton on 
average. For every ten cent per gallon increase in the price of unleaded gasoline, the price of 
ethano l is expected to increase by about eight cents per gallon on average. 
Root Mean Square Error Analysis 
Table 2 reports the RMSE for each commodity in each commodity's typical measure 
of price per unit as well as on a percentage basis for comparison across markets. The base 
price levels used in caJculating the percentage RMSE were taken as the average over the 
predicted and actua l price levels for each commodity. The RMSE measures for com, 
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unleaded gasoline, and natural gas reflect the accuracy of the futures markets over the 
historical period analyzed. Table 2 shows that the levels of accuracy achieved by the pricing 
models are quite comparable to the level of accuracy exhibited in the futures markets. In 
fact, the 14 percent and 16.6 percent levels of e1Tor calculated for the ethanol and DOGS 
regression models, respectively, are considerab ly lower than the levels of error in the futu res 
markets for unleaded gasoline and natural gas. 
Table 2: RMSECom arisons Across Commodities 
Market RMSE Average RMSE Price Level (%) 
Corn Futures $0.40 $2.60 15.4% ($/bu) 
Unleaded 
Gasoline Futures $0.12 $0.60 19.6% 
($/gal) 
Natural Gas Futures $1 .17 $2.53 46.4% ($/gal) 
Ethanol 
Regression $0.17 $1.21 14.0% ($/gal) 
DOGS Regression $17.45 $105.14 16.6% ($/ton) 
Serial Correlation 
The coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-stati stics, and p-values for the tests for 
serial correlation are reported for each pricing model (D and E) in Table 3. The results show 
strong evidence of 151 order serial correlation (both rejected H0: p = 0 at l percent), therefore 
the data was transfonned to correct for thi s problem by differencing each price series and 
estimating differenced regression models. 
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Table 3: Testin for Serial Correlation in Models D and E 
Model 
Dependent Independent P t-stat 
Variable Variable (S.E.) (p-value) 
A " 0.87 24.72 
D £1 £1- I (0.035) (0) 
(S/ton) ($/ton) 
A A 
0 .85 16.10 
E £1 £1- I (0.052) (0) ($/ga l) (S/gal) 
Differenced Pricing Model Estimates 
The coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-statistics and p-values for models Wand 
~E are summarized in Table 4. The coefficient estimates were a ll s ignificant at a five 
percent significance level. The estimates imply that a ten cent per bushel change in the price 
of com will lead to a$ l .80 per ton change in the price ofDDGS on average. A ten cent per 
gallon change in the price of unleaded gasoline is consistent with a 4.5 cent per gallon 
change in the price of ethanol on average. 
Table 4 : S umma!)'. Statistics for Models ADand AE 
A 
Model Dependent Independent fJ t-stat Variable Variable 
(S.E.) 
(p-value) 
~D ~DDGP, t:.CORNP, 11 .79 2.37 (0.02) 
($/ton) ($/bu) (4.97) 
~E MTH~ ~UNLP, 0.45 6.48 
(S/gal) ($/gal) (0.07) (0) 
Rank Correlation Model Estimates 
The coefficient estimates, standard errors, and t-statistics for the rank coITelation 
models are summarized in Table 5. The coefficient estimates were found to be stati stically 
significant at I percent for both models. The estimated s lope coefficients were negative for 
both mode ls, wbich implies that as the time lag between contracts gets larger the correlation 
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decreases, w hich parallels the correlation structure in the historical matrix. The modified 
target rank correlation matrix is included in the appendix as Figure A-2. 
Table 5: Summary tatistics for the Rank Correlation Re2;ression Models 
" " 
Model Dependent Independent a t-stat /3 t-stat Variable Variable (S.E.) (p-value) (S.E.) (p-value) 
3 
Unleaded Time lag 0.71 12.84 -0.052 -4.75 
Correlations (months) (0.055) (0) (0 .011) (0) 
3 
Natural Gas Time lag 0.82 23.96 -0.024 -3.61 
Correlations (months) (0 .034) (0) (0.007) (0) 
Premium Rates 
Using the formulation for calculating the margin guarantee and actual gross margin 
level us ing equation I, fair premiums were detem1ined for the 2002 contract year from 
predicted prices and using the transformed Monte Carlo draws as 5000 s imulated actual price 
scenarios. Premiums and indemnities were calcu lated at various coverage levels using both 
types of DDGS and ethano l price prediction models outlined previous ly. Table 6 
summarizes the margin guarantees and fair premium at various coverage levels. The margin 
guarantee and premiums calculated using models D and E for predicting prices are denoted 
by LEVEL. The margin guarantee and premiums calcu lated using models 60 and 6E are 
denoted by DJFF. Table 7 reports the base price levels used with the DIFF pricing models. 
The base price levels for corn and unleaded gasoline were taken as actual March futures 
prices in the contract year. The base levels for DOGS and ethanol were taken as the average 
of the actual spot prices for March from the data sets described previously. 
Premium levels are very s imi lar for both pricing models used. However, the 
premiums ca lculated using the DIFF pricing models are a higher percentage of the margin 
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guaran tee. At fu ll coverage, the LEVEL pri cing models yie lded an 8.6 percent premium, 
wh ile the DIFF mode ls yie lded an I J .7 percent premium. As the level of coverage is 
lowered to 85 percent, the premiums fall to 3. 1 percent and 6.1 percent of the margin 
guarantee fo r the LEVEL and DIFF models, respectively. For the 2002 contract year, as the 
level of coverage fa ll s, the DTFF premiums become re latively higher than the premium rates 
calcu lated using the LEVEL pricing models. The distri bution of the uninsured actual gros 
margin values is illustrated in Figures 3 for the LEV EL models and in Figure 4 for the DJFF 
pricing mode ls. The figure show the di persion of actual gross margin scenarios under the 
distributional assumptions of the Monte Carlo simulations. 
Table 6: Per Bushel Premiums $/bu at Various Covera e Levels 
Premiums by Coverage Level 
Pricing Margin (%of Margin Guarantee) 
Model Guarantee 
100% 95% 90% 85% 
LEVEL $1 .57 $0.135 $0.099 $0.071 $0.049 
(8.6%) (6.3%) (4.5%) (3.1%) 
DIFF $1 .13 $0.132 $0.107 $0.086 $0.068 (11 .7%) (9.5%) (7.6%) (6.1%) 
Table 7: Ba e Price Levels Used for DIFF Models 
Commodity Base Price 
Ethanol $1 .12/gal 
Unleaded 
$0.59/ga l Gasoline 
DOGS $79.00/ton 
Corn $2.02/bu. 
While the mean leve ls of gross margin differ accordi ng to the pric ing mode ls used, 
the dispersion of po sible gross margin scenarios about rhe mean is imilar regard I es of 
which pricing models are used in the Monte Carlo ana lysis. Figures 5 and 6 il lustrate the 
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distribution of gross margins scenarios when insurance is purchased at a coverage level of 85 
percent for the LEVEL and DIFF pricing models, respectively. Roughl y 35 percent of the 
downside risk is eliminated through the purchase of the insurance. However, there is a risk-
reward tradeoff in that the possibilities of earning high levels of gross margin are somewhat 
lowered. Figures A-5 through A- 10, included in the appendix, illustrate the distribution of 
gross margin scenarios at the other coverage levels for both the LEVEL and DIFF pricing 
models. 
While the structure of the product is the same for both sets of pricing models, the 
marginal effects of price changes for each commodity on the value of the product is different 
for each pricing model used. Table 8 summarizes the marginal effects of price movements 
for each commodity. The marginal effects are repo1ted as the change in value, per bushel , of 
the insurance claim for a ten cent increase in the average actual price level from the average 
predicted price level for that commodity, holding all else constant. 
Table 8: Mar inal Effects on Product Value $/bu bv Commoditv 
Marginal Effect on Product Value 
Pricing 
Model 
(for $0.10 increase in price) 
Unleaded 
($/gal) 
Corn 
($/bu) 
LEVEL ($0.221) $0.071 
DIFF ($0.122) $0.090 
Natural Gas 
($/gal) 
$0.017 
$0.017 
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The marginal effects of price changes in the gasoline market have a marginal effect 
three times as large as that of price changes in the com market when the product is structured 
using the LEVEL pricing models. Under the DIFF models the marginal effects of price 
changes in the corn and gasoline markets are more even, with the gasoline market having a 
slightly larger effect on the value of the product. This may provide more support for using 
the DlFF models rather than the level models beyond the statistical properties analyzed 
earli er. Since this product is aimed at com producers, tbey may find it more valuable to have 
relatively more weight on com price vo lati lity in determining the va lue of the insurance 
product. However, the LEVEL models may be viewed as the simpler a lternati ve. The 
LEVEL models also have the benefit of the product being structured using only futures 
prices. Futures markets are very large and liquid markets rel ative to any corn producer. 
Using only futures prices eli mjnates tbe moral hazard problem of an agent having tbe abil ity 
to affect the value of the product. The DIFF models requ ire some kind of spot market base 
level, which could create moral hazard problems. Using some type of regional average as the 
base price level for ethanol and DOGS can eliminate this problem. It should be noted that in 
using either model , there are opposing forces on the tota l marginal effect of changes in the 
com price. Corn is used as an input to the process, which increases the product va lue when 
actual prices are higher than pred icted . However, changes in com prices have positi ve 
marginal effects on the acnia l price used for DDGS in detern1ining the value of the product at 
termination. Therefore changes in corn prices a lso decrease the product value through the 
determination of actual DDGS price levels used in contract settlement. 
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Historical Analysis 
Margin guarantees, actual margi ns, and indemnity payments were calculated using 
tbe LEVEL models from 1991 through 2003. Margin guarantees and actual margins were 
calculated usi ng the DIFF models from 1994 through 2003, with base leve ls calculated in the 
same manner as they were in the prev ious section. Historical premiums were a lso calculated 
based on the percentages of the margin guarantee taken from the Monte Carlo results for the 
2002 contract year for the various coverage levels. Tables 9 and 10 summarize these results 
for the LEVEL and DIFF pricing models respectively. 
Table 9: Marginsl lndemnitiesl and Premiums - LEVEL Models 
Policy Margin Indemnities Premiums 
Year Guarantee Actual 100% 95% 90% 85% 100% 95% 90% 85% 
1991 $1 .25 $1.52 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.11 $0.08 $0.06 $0.04 
1992 $1.17 $1.51 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10 $0.07 $0.05 $0.04 
1993 $1.44 $1.06 $0.38 $0.30 $0.23 $0.16 $0.12 $0.09 $0.06 $0.04 
1994 $0.79 $1.31 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.07 $0.05 $0.04 $0.02 
1995 $1.24 $0.79 $0.45 $0.39 $0.33 $0.26 $0.11 $0.08 $0.06 $0.04 
1996 $0.53 $0.48 $0.05 $0.03 $0.00 $0.00 $0.05 $0.03 $0.02 $0.02 
1997 $0.99 $1 .12 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.09 $0.06 $0.04 $0.03 
1998 $0.85 $1 .16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.07 $0.05 $0.04 $0.03 
1999 $1 .08 $1.66 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.09 $0.07 $0.05 $0.03 
2000 $1.67 $1.83 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.14 $0.11 $0.07 $0.05 
2001 $1 .28 $1.76 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.11 $0.08 $0.06 $0.04 
2002 $1.57 $1.61 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.14 $0.10 $0.07 $0.05 
2003 $1 .50 $1.47 $0.03 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.13 $0.09 $0.07 $0.05 
Total $0.91 $0.72 $0.56 $0.42 $1 .32 $0.97 $0.69 $0.48 
With premiums calculated as a percentage of the margin guarantee for the contract 
year, premium levels and margin guarantees are directly proportional to each other. 
Structuring the product with the LEVEL pricing models, indemnities payments were paid in 
1993, 1994, and 1996. Using the DIFF pricing models in structuring the product yielded 
similar results in that indemnities were also paid in 1994 and 1996. However, the actual 
value of the indemnities differed, due to the differences in how the pricing models project tbe 
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levels of guaranteed and actual gross margins. 1993, 1994, and 1996 were years of high 
volati lity in the com futures markets. The predicted prices for corn were well below the 
actual levels in aJJ three years. The predictions were $0. 18, $0.56, and $0.34 below the 
actual values for 1993, 1994, and 1996 respectively. The price of un leaded gaso line was 
over-predicted in 1993 ($0.08), which also increased the value of the product. In 1994 and 
1996 un leaded gasoline prices were under-predicted by $0.02 and $0.1 2 respectively, but 
these effects were outweighed by the extreme vo latility in the corn market for those years . 
These results confom achievement of the objective in developing this product. The policy 
has va lue under conditions of extreme price volatili ty. 
The va lue of the stream of indemnity payments is less than the stream of premium 
payments6 required to carry the product over the historical period analyzed. However, as the 
level of coverage decreases, the difference between the two streams of payments decreases. 
This implies that producers would have been better off buying lower levels of coverage over 
the period analyzed, regardless of which pricing models were used to structure the product. 
The fact that the premium stream is larger than the indemnity 
Table 10: Margins2 lndemnities2 and Premiums - DIFF Models 
Policy Margin Indemnities Premiums 
Year Guarantee Actual 100% 95% 90% 85% 100% 95% 90% 85% 
1994 $1.01 $1 .55 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.12 $0.10 $0.08 $0.06 
1995 $1.18 $0.58 $0.60 $0.54 $0.48 $0.42 $0.14 $0. 11 $0.09 $0.07 
1996 $0.72 $0.49 $0.23 $0.20 $0.16 $0.12 $0.08 $0.07 $0.05 $0.04 
1997 $0.96 $1.13 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.11 $0.09 $0.07 $0.06 
1998 $0.54 $1.05 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.06 $0.05 $0.04 $0.03 
1999 $0.98 $1.40 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.12 $0.09 $0.07 $0.06 
2000 $0.79 $0.90 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.09 $0.07 $0.06 $0.05 
2001 $1 .59 $2.19 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.19 $0.15 $0.12 $0.10 
2002 $1 .13 $1.01 $0.11 $0.06 $0.00 $0.00 $0.13 $0. 11 $0.09 $0.07 
2003 $0.93 $0.95 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.11 $0.09 $0.07 $0.06 
Total $0.95 $0.79 $0.64 $0.55 $1.15 $0.93 $0.75 $0.60 
6 The indenmities and premiums are reported in nominal terms wi th no time discounting. 
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stream is an interesting result. A fair premium, by definition, should equate the payments 
received from the product to the cost of carrying the product over a period of time. lt may be 
possib le that the time period analyzed was simply too small , but ethanol production did not 
become a maj or enterprise fo r com producers until the early I 990's. Therefore, analyzing 
older histori cal price data may not reflect true relationships. Another possible reason for 
these results is the presence of bias in the futures markets for the commodities used in 
structuring the product. The accuracy of the predictions for each commodi ty price market 
was analyzed for each period. On average the predicted price of unleaded gasoline was 
$0.05 (7.38%) lower than the actual price levels used in contract settl ement. The predicted 
prices for natural gas also exhibited a negative bias of $0.19 (7.68%). The predicted prices 
for com were, on average, $0. 12 ( 4.69%) higher than the actual prices used in contract 
settlement. The negative and positive bias in the gasoline and com markets, respectively, 
both cause a decrease in the va lue of the product. The negative bias in the natural gas market 
wou ld increase the value of the product, but the marginal effect of changes in natural gas 
prices was shown to be marginally small relative to the effects of changes in corn and 
gasoline prices. It should be noted that these biases are ca lculated only as averages over the 
historical period analyzed. Futures market bias should be virtually eliminated by arbitrage, 
on average, if examined over a longer time interval. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
To detem1ine the effect of price volatili ty on the premium rates for the product, fa ir 
premiums were calculated using higher levels of volatility in the Monte Carlo price draws. 
Volatilities were increased for each commodity price draw by ten percent. Table A-2, 
included in the Appendix, reports the higher volatili ties imposed on the price distributions 
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used for premium determination. The premiums are reported in Table 11 for both the 
LEVEL and DIFF pricing models. Increasing the price volatilities by ten percent causes the 
premium levels to increase. Higher volatility implies more uncertainty, which raises the fair 
cost of the product. The higher vo latili ty cause the premium rates to increase from 8.6 
percent and 11 . 7 percent to 11 .5 percent and 16.3 percent of the margin guarantee at I 00 
percent coverage for the LEVEL and DIFF models respectively. Again, at full coverage the 
premiums are roughly equiva lent, but as the level of coverage fa lls the calculated premiums 
using the DIFF pricing models become re latively more expensive the LEVEL model 
premmms. 
Table 1 t : Per Bushel Premiums at Various Coverage Levels, 10% Higher Volatility 
Pricing Margin 
Premiums by Coverage Level 
(%of Margin Guarantee) 
Model Guarantee 
100% 95% 90% 85% 
LEVEL $1.57 $0.181 $0.145 
$0.114 $0.089 
(11 .5%) (9.2%) (7.2%) (5.6%) 
DIFF $1.13 $0.184 $0. 159 $0.137 $0. 11 8 (16.3%) (14.1%) (12.2%) (10.4%) 
At the higher levels of price volatility, the actual premium rates increase by about 39 
percent at full coverage for both pricing models. At 95 percent coverage, the premium rates 
increase by about 48 percent fo r both pricing mode ls. At 90 percent coverage, the premium 
rates increase by about 60 percent fo r both pric ing models. As the coverage level fa lls to 85 
percent, the premiums rates increase by over 70 percent for both pricing models. This 
implies that premiums at a ll levels of coverage are extremely sensitive to the level of 
vo latility assumed for the commodity prices. Premiums at lower levels of coverage are 
re latively more sensitive to the level of assumed price volatili ty. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
General Conclusions 
C u1Tently there are a w ide variety of insurance products ava ilable to agricultural 
producers to insure against yie ld or price risks in the markets for the raw commodities in 
which they produce. Over the last decade farmers have been divers ifying by becoming 
involved with value-added enterprises such as ethano l production. This research developed 
an insurance product aimed at com producers who are members in an ethano l production 
cooperati ve. The product has the potential to provide these producers a new and useful ri sk 
management tool. 
The product is structured to insure against price risks in the markets for corn, DOGS, 
ethano l, and natural gas . Futures prices for corn, un leaded gasoline, and natural gas were 
used to develop two different pricing models, which were used to structure the product to 
insure the gross margin level of an ethanol production fac ility on a per bushel basis. The 
gross margin was chosen as it should provide an adequate proxy for premium payments the 
producer would receive from the fac ility. Both pricing mode ls are statistically unbiased 
estimators o f the DDGS and ethanol prices, but provide two di fferent structures for the 
product. Both pricing mode ls were also shown to exhibit a comparable level of accuracy to 
the futu res markets for corn, un leaded gasoline, and natura l gas. 
Monte Carlo ana lysis was used to develop fa ir premiums at various coverage levels. 
A historica l correlation structure was imposed on the simulated price data using a method 
proposed by Iman and Conover, which maintains the marginal distributions of the variables. 
Premiums were calculated based on both pricing models at various coverage levels. The 
relative size of the marginal effects of price movements for each commodity differs between 
50 
tbe two models. Therefore, the two pricing models yielded s lightly different premium 
structures. 
Historical analysis was carried out to examine how the product would have perfom1ed 
had it been offered over the last decade, comparing the results fo r both pricing models. The 
product was shown to perform as was intended, paying indemnities in years of extreme price 
volati li ty. The stream of indemnity payments was shown to be smaller than the stream of 
premium payments required to carry the product over the historica l period analyzed. This 
result may come from the fact that the historical period analyzed was relatively small , or 
from bias exh ibited in the futures markets for corn and unleaded gasoline over the historical 
period analyzed. 
Sensi ti vity analys is was also performed to determine tbe effect of vo latility levels on 
the fair premiums. As expected, premium rates increased as the level of price vo latili ty was 
increased. This effect was shown to be more severe as the level of coverage decreased. 
Future Research 
This product was rated using pricing prox ies fo r ethanol and DDGS prices because 
there were no future markets for either of these commodities when this research was 
conducted. With the introduction of ethanol futures markets both on the NYBOT and CBOT 
forthcoming, there is the potential to reconduct this ana lysis and to more accurate ly price the 
product. Eliminating the use of a regression pricing model wi ll remove more of the error and 
variabi lity in calculating the fair premium rates. Gaso line prices were shown to have a fairly 
strong correlation to cash ethanol prices in the Midwest, but a true ethanol futures contract 
would theoretically be a much more accurate index of cash ethanol prices in all regions of the 
U.S. 
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Other applicable areas include other value-added industries. The biodiesel industry 
has also seen extensive growth over the last 5 year s, as soybean fam1ers have started to tum 
to this young industry to di versify and find new markets for what they produce. Biodiese l 
plants are in the planning and construction phases a ll across the U.S., many of which are 
being built as farmer owned cooperatives similar to the alread y existing ethanol cooperatives. 
As farmers continue to find new markets and new techniques to market their products, there 
will need to be new advances in the area of risk management to create new ri sk management 
tool s for these farmers to hedge against the ri sks embodied in thei r new ventures. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-1: Price Distribution Assumptions, Actual Implied Volatilities 
Price 
Distribution Assumptions 
Variable Mean Annua lized Adjust Volati lity Volatility* 
Mar Corn $2.01 
May Corn $2.08 17.1% 7.0% 
July Corn $2.15 20.0% 11 .5% 
Sep Corn $2.22 25.2% 17.8% 
Dec Corn $2.30 22.3% 19.3% 
Mar+1 Corn $2.39 19.7% 19.7% 
Jan+1 Uni $0.64 36.7% 33.5% 
Feb+1 Uni $0.65 36.7% 35.1% 
Mar+1 Uni $0.65 36.7% 36.7% 
Apr Uni $0.73 39.6% 11.4% 
May Uni $0.74 41 .7% 17.0% 
June Uni $0.74 42.3% 21 .1% 
July Uni $0.73 40.4% 23.3% 
Aug Uni $0.71 39.4% 25.4% 
Sep Uni $0.69 38.1% 26.9% 
Oct Uni $0.66 36.7% 28.0% 
Nov Uni $0.65 36.7% 29.9% 
Dec Uni $0.64 36.7% 31 .7% 
Jan+1 NG $3.41 45.1% 41.2% 
Feb+1 NG $3.35 48.3% 46.3% 
Mar+1 NG $3.25 41 .7% 41 .7% 
Apr NG $2.53 48.6% 14.0% 
May NG $2.57 46.8% 19.1% 
June NG $2.63 43.5% 21 .7% 
July NG $2.68 43.1% 24.9% 
Aug NG $2.73 43.5% 28.1% 
Sep NG $2.74 43.7% 30.9% 
Oct NG $2.78 43.8% 33.5% 
Nov NG $3.04 44.3% 36.2% 
Dec NG $3.30 44.8% 38.8% 
*Based on time to maturity. 
Note: + J refers to the fol lowing calendar year. 
53 
Table A-2 : Price Distribution Assumptions, Increased Volatility 
Distribution Assumptions 
Price 
Variable Mean Annualized Adjusted Volatility Volatility* 
Mar Corn $2.01 
May Corn $2.08 27.1% 11.1% 
July Corn $2.15 30.0% 17.3% 
Sep Corn $2.22 35.2% 24.9% 
Dec Corn $2.30 32.3% 27.9% 
Mar+1 Corn $2.39 29.7% 29.7% 
Jan+1 Uni $0.64 46.7% 42.6% 
Feb+1 Uni $0.65 46.7% 44.7% 
Mar+1 Uni $0.65 46.7% 46.7% 
Apr Uni $0.73 49.6% 14.3% 
May Uni $0.74 51 .7% 21 .1% 
June Uni $0.74 52.3% 26.1% 
July Uni $0.73 50.4% 29.1% 
Aug Uni $0.71 49.4% 31 .9% 
Sep Uni $0.69 48.1% 34.0% 
Oct Uni $0.66 46.7% 35.6% 
Nov Uni $0.65 46.7% 38.1% 
Dec Uni $0.64 46.7% 40.4% 
Jan+1 NG $3.41 55.1% 50.3% 
Feb+1 NG $3.35 58.3% 55.8% 
Mar+1 NG $3.25 51 .7% 51 .7% 
Apr NG $2.53 58.6% 16.9% 
May NG $2.57 56.8% 23.2% 
June NG $2.63 53.5% 26.7% 
July NG $2.68 53.1% 30.7% 
Aug NG $2.73 53.5% 34.5% 
Sep NG $2.74 53.7% 38.0% 
Oct NG $2.78 53.8% 41 .1% 
Nov NG $3.04 54.3% 44.3% 
Dec NG $3.30 54.8% 47.4% 
*Based on time to maturity. 
Note: + I re fers to the following calendar year. 
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Figure A-1: Historical Rank Correlation Matrix 
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Figure A-2: Target Rank Correlation Matrix 
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Figure A-5: Distribution of Gross Margins ($/bu) at 100% Coverage-LEVEL 
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Figure A-6: Distribution of Gross Margins ($/bu) at 100% Coverage-DIFF 
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Figure A-7: Distribution of Gross Margins ($/bu) at 95% Coverage-LEVEL 
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Figure A-8: Distribution of Gross Margins ($/bu) at 95% Coverage-DIFF 
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Figure A-9: Distribution of Gross Margins ($/bu) at 90% Coverage-LEVEL 
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